Exploiting time series of the cost of a staples basket across 75 Russian regions over 1994-2000, price linkages of the regions are analyzed with the use of Granger causality as a tool. Price linkages of Russian regions are found extensive: on average, an individual regional market is linked through prices with 62% of others. Neither isolated clusters of regions nor autarkic regions are revealed; each region is linked with all others either directly or indirectly, through a chain of no more than two intermediate regions. Spatial autocorrelation is found to be widespread, taking place in two thirds of regions.
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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
A spatially dispersed goods market can be defined as integrated if there are no barriers to trade among locations except for "natural," irremovable ones such as distances separating locations. A necessary condition for market to be integrated is occurrence of prices linkages across locations, so that a price shock in one location evokes responses in others. Thus, a pattern of inter-location price linkages complements a pattern of goods market integration obtained by other methods.
A tool for analyzing price linkages is Granger causality. The price of a good in one (first) location is said to be Granger caused by price in other (second) location if past values of price in the second location are significant in explanation of the current value of the first location's price. This paper analyzes price linkages across 75 (of all the 89) regions of Russia in 1994-2000, exploiting the above tool. The cost of a staples basket (relative to its cost for Russia as a whole) is used as a price representative.
Price linkages of Russian regions are found extensive. On average, an individual regional market is linked through prices with 62% of others, with the minimal number equaling 35%. Such a pattern corroborates the pattern of market integration obtained earlier, in which the most regions are integrated or tending to integration with the national market.
The pattern of price linkages sheds light on the issue of integration clubs. The integration club (an analog of convergence club in economic growth) is a group of regions that are not integrated or tending to integration with the national market, while being integrated or tending to integration with one another. Analyzing price linkages, neither isolated groups of regions nor autarkic regions are found. Price in each region is linked with prices in all others either directly or indirectly, through a chain of no more than two intermediate regions. This provides an evidence of absence of integration clubs in the Russian market.
A dependence of prices in a region on prices in adjacent regions implies spatial autocorrelation. It is found to be widespread, taking place in two thirds of regions. This fact should be taken into account while spatially modeling Russian market with the use of data on the cost of staples basket.
INTRODUCTION
A spatially dispersed goods market can be defined as integrated if there are no barriers to trade among its spatial segments (locations) except for "natural," irremovable ones such as physical distances separating locations. Provided that the market is integrated, prices across locations should be linked, so that a price shock in one location evokes responses in others.
Sometimes, such linkages themselves are considered as an indication of market integration.
However, price linkages are only a necessary condition for market integration, and not a sufficient one. Given an occurrence of price linkage between two locations, we can conclude nothing regarding the existence of trade barriers but that if they exist, they are not so high as to fully block trade between these locations. Nonetheless, an analysis of inter-location price linkages complements a pattern obtained through analyzing market integration as such, providing additional aspects of this pattern.
Analyzing Russia's market integration, Gluschenko (2006) divides regions of the country into three groups: (a) regions integrated with the national market over 1994-2000; (b) nonintegrated regions tending toward integration with the national market; and (c) non-integrated regions that show no indication of an integrating trend. In such a pattern, however, the occurrence of "integration clubs" (an analog of convergence clubs in economic growth; see, e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995) remains an open question. Among regions that are not integrated (or/and not tending to integration) with the national market, there may be regions that are integrated (or/and tending to integration) with one another, so forming integration clubs and thus making integration of the Russian market to be fragmented. This paper aims to shed light on this issue. One more objective of the paper is to verify the above pattern of market integration, examining the extensiveness of inter-regional price linkages. At last, the effect of spatial lags is studied.
The empirical methodology is based on testing for Granger causality. The source data are time series of the cost of a staples basket across 75 regions of Russia for 1994-2000 with a monthly frequency. Using this methodology and data, no indications of integration clubs in the Russian goods market are revealed. Price linkages of Russian regions are found extensive: on average, an individual regional market is linked through prices with 62% of others. Thus, the pattern of price linkages is compatible with that of market integration, as the latter suggests that 4 only 20% of Russian regions are not integrated with the national market and have no trend to integration, the reason for non-integration being, for the most part, a constant persistent difference in prices. Spatial autocorrelation is found to be widespread, taking place in two thirds of regions.
The analysis in this paper relates to studies by Goodwin, Grennes, and McCurdy (1999) and Berkowitz, DeJong, and Husted (1998) , who also analyzed causal relationships between prices in the Russian market. The first paper uses data running from June of 1993 through December of 1994 with a weekly frequency and covering five cities and four individual goods. 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The price representative for the analysis is the cost of the basket of 25 basic food goods Let r and s index regions (r, s =1,…,R) and t indexes time (t = 0,…,T). The source price variable is the log relative cost of the basket, P rt = ln(p rt /p 0t ), where p rt is the local cost of the basket and p 0t is the cost of the basket for Russia as a whole. To isolate price shocks, P rt is cleaned of deterministic components through detrending and debreaking, producing P′ r as
, where rt ν is the estimate of residual in regression (across t = 0,…,T)
The quadratic trend is taken to approximate nonlinear trends found in the time series;
experiments with polynomials of different orders suggest that the second order is enough for such an approximation. The structural break is due to the August 1998 financial crisis in Russia.
It is modeled by B θrt = 1 if t < θ, and zero otherwise. The break points, θ, are not uniform across regions, varying from 1998:08 through 1999:02. They are found by estimating (1) for θ = 1998:08,…,1999:02 for a given region, and then choosing θ that yields the least sum of squared residuals.
For each region pair (r, s), the following regressions are estimated across t = l,…, T: 
and the following hypotheses are tested: H 0(sr) : 0 ... (P′ r does not Granger cause P′ s ). Throughout the paper, the 10-percent significance level is accepted. Rejection of, say, H 0(sr) implies a "causal" relationship among prices in r and s, the latter Granger causing the former. An interpretation is that a price 6 shock in s at any point in time from t -l,…, t -1 evokes response in r, so suggesting that there is a price linkage between these regions. A rejection of H 0(rs) will be denoted as r → s; that of H 0(sr) will be denoted as s → r or r ← s; and joint rejection of H 0(rs) and H 0(sr) , implying bi-directional causality or feedback, will be denoted as r ↔ s.
Having run the Granger causality test for all region pairs, the results can be summarized in an R×R matrix C = (C sr ) such that C sr = 1 if r → s, and C sr = 0 otherwise; C rr ≡ 1. In fact, this is the adjacency matrix of a "causality graph" displaying direct price linkages between regions. If price in r does not affect price in s, but price in r affects price in q which, in turn, affects price in price linkages with one another, and no one is linked with a region beyond this submarket. It is such submarkets that can potentially be integration clubs. A one-element block is an autarkic regional market that has price linkages with no one other region.
In the spatial context, an analog of autocorrelation is possible (Anselin, 1988) . As spatial autocorrelation can result in model misspecifications if it is ignored, it is important to reveal whether it takes place in the data under consideration. The notion of spatial lag is ambiguous, since, in contrast to time series, a "preceding" observation can be non-unique. As a rule, a spatial lag "r -1" for location r is constructed artificially from observations for contiguous locations.
Here, a region's spatial lag, P′ "r-1",t , is a weighted average of prices in neighboring (from the is the Kamchatka and Magadan oblasts which share a common border, but no trade occurs through it. For the both, the Primorski Krai is taken as their trade neighbor, since deliveries of goods to these regions come through Vladivostok, the capital city of the Primorski Krai. To detect spatial autocorrelation, testing for Granger causality is applied as well. If "r -1" → r, it is interpreted as evidence of spatial autocorrelation.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Before testing for Granger causality, the lags length, l, in (2) should be assigned. A conventional procedure of choosing it is to estimate (2) across a set of l and then to take a proper number basing on the Akaike or Schwarz criterion individually for each pair (r, s). Given 2775 pairs produced by 75 regions, such a procedure would be a daunting task. Therefore, a different way is exploited: regressions (2) are estimated and tested with l = 3, 6, and 12, and these results are compared across l. Table 1 compares some summary statistics of the results; and Table 2 repots correlation between results for different lag lengths. The numbers of instances of causality are those for a given region r; they are computed as follows. By and large, the results for 3, 6, and 12 lags prove to be fairly similar, having no fundamental qualitative differences. As could be expected, additional lags increase detected instances of causality when l changes from 3 to 6. However, the loss in the degrees of freedom decreases detected instances of causality if 6 lags more are added. Thus, 6 lags seems to be a proper lag length. From the intuitive standpoint, a half-year delay is believed enough for evoking a response in the very distant regions of the country. From the statistical standpoint, such a loss in the degrees of freedom is reasonably small. Anyway, as the comparisons suggest, a deviation from optimal lag lengths cannot sufficiently distort the pattern of causality. Table 3 summarizes results of testing for Granger causality for the baseline case of 6 lags.
The second through fifth columns report N r→ , N r← , N r↔ , and N r , respectively, for a given region.
The last column contains p-value of the null hypothesis that the spatially lagged price do not Granger cause the price in a given region, values above the critical significance level (of 10%) being marked with bold italics. The number of region's trade neighbors are in parentheses in this column. that have only one trade neighbor as well: spatial autocorrelation is not rejected for them.
CONCLUSIONS
Using the cost of basket of 25 basic food goods as the price representative, price linkages of Russian regions have been analyzed with the use of Granger causality as a tool. Price linkages of Russian regions are found extensive. On average, an individual regional market is linked through prices with 62% of others, with the minimal number equaling 35%. Such a pattern corroborates the pattern of market integration found by Gluschenko (2006) , in which the most regions are integrated or tending to integration with the national market.
Neither isolated clusters of regions nor autarkic regions are found. Each region is linked with all others either directly or indirectly, through a chain of no more than two intermediate regions. This provides an evidence of absence of integration clubs in the Russian market.
